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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DEVON GEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No.
14012

SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from a memorandum decision of the
Third Judicial District Court denying his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus,
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

This

Court upheld the conviction in State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96,
498 P.2d 662 (1972).

Then a petition for a writ of coram nobis

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was denied by the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins on January 30,
1973.

This Court, in State v. Gee, 30 Utah 2d 148, 514 P.2d

809 (1973), held that the coram nobis proceeding was an
improper action.

On February 13, 1975, the Honorable Stewart

M. Hanson, in a memorandum decision, denied appellant's

j

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks the affirmance of the lower court's
decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Upon stipulation of the parties, the transcript of
the coram nobis proceeding on January 30, 1973, which was
denied by the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, was received as
evidence at the habeas corpus hearing on February 13, 1975,
and is part of the record in the present case.

That transcript

discloses the following pertinent facts:
During the appellant's criminal trial, while in the
restroom# a lady claiming to be a grandparent, was showing a
photograph of the deceased victim to several people in the
restroom (T.20) . A juror, Mrs. Bertul, testified that on her

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

way out of the restroom, she happened to glance at the
photograph (T. 18).

The photograph was not shown to her

directly and there was no attempt specifically directed to
influence Mrs. Bertul (T.20).

After previously examining

photographs which were introduced into evidence at trial

;

which depicted the brutalized condition of the victim,
Mrs. Bertul testified that the glance at the photograph
in the restroom had no effect whatsoever on her deliberations
of the verdict (T.18,19).
The lower court, which heard the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, held in a memorandum decision that no evidence was adduced that would indicate that the jury
would have reached any other verdict for the defendant, and for
this reason, among others, denied the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
TRIAL WHEN DURING A RECESS OF THE TRIAL A MEMBER OF THE JURY
HAPPENED TO GLANCE AT A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE VICTIM.

-3-
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The apparent general standard to be applied to
jury conduct to warrant a mistrial has been set out in Utah
case law.

The two prong test consists of affirmative improper

misconduct on the part of the juror, and the misconduct must
be prejudicial in that a different verdict could have been
reached had the influence not been present.
This standard can be seen in State v. Crank, 105
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943), where a juror and a prosecution
witness engaged in conversation immediately before the case
was submitted to the jury.

This Court held that this conduct

was clearly improper or misconduct, but because the case was
reversed on other grounds there was no need to rule on the
second element of prejudicial error.
Utah case law in this area of the law fit within
the standard of improper conduct and prejudicial effect, as
seen by State v. Ahrens, 25 Utah 2d 222, 479 P.2d 786 (1971),
and State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P.2d 941 (1925), in
which there was overt improper conduct that had a prejudicial
effect.

-4-
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The present case fails to meet this standard.
The juror did not commit an affirmative improper act.
She happened to glance at a photograph being shown to
everyone in the restroom as she was leaving (T.20). .
The photograph was not shown to her directly and there
was no attempt specifically directed at influencing the
juror (T.20) .
There is nothing in the record which indicates
that the juror entered the restroom with an improper
purpose/ nor did she seek to obtain any further information relative to the case.

This conduct does not go

beyond the usual amenities between jurors and acquaintances
who appear upon the scene when the jury is not sequestered.
This is shown by the following testimony:

-5-
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"Q. One other thing. When
you were in the rest room, this
woman didn f t come up to you and show
you the picture; she was showing it
to someone else, and you saw it?
A. Yes.
Q. And you overheard part of
the conversation of what she was saying,
is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And I assume when you did hear
that, why, you got out of the rest room
as soon as you could, is that correct?
A. Yes, I said, "My word, I'm on
the jury. Let me out of here."
(T. page 20, lines 19-30.)

" Q. You happened t o see i t ? You
looked over t h e r e but she d i d n ' t come
up t o you i n d i v i d u a l l y and show i t to you,
did she?
A. I just happened to see it.
Q. You just happened to see it?
A. Well, how can you happen but see
it when she's showing it to everybody?
Q. Actually, the picturesthat were
introduced at the trial were of convincing
evidence to you of his guilt, coupled with
the testimony as to how those injuries
occurred, isn't that right?
A. This is true.
Q. So there was nothing about the
picture that you did see of the child in
the rest room that was reprehensible?
A. I wouldn't even know it was the
same child. No, it had no bearing at
all on my decision. I know the baby was
harmed very brutally.

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q. But that was based on
the evidence that was introduced
at trial, i^n't that right?
A. This is right." (T. page
18, lines 20-23, page 19, lines 1-5.)
"Q. Now, this woman who you did
overhear and had the picture, she was
not a witness in that case, was she?
A. No.
Q. As far as you are concerned,
then, you don't know what she said was
the truth or not the truth, is that
correct?
A. She was telling everyone that she
was —
Q. No, but what I mean, you did not
know whether or not what you overheard was
the truth or not, is that correct?
A. Yes, Mr. Banks." (T., page 21,
lines 1-11.)

;
j
i

When a jury is not sequestered, the juror is to conform
with the cautionary instructions of the court.

He is to divorce

himself from any prejudicial material and not take into consideration any outside influences.
presumption.

This actually creates a

In absence of evidence to the contrary, it should

be presumed that the jury followed the court's instructions
and the court adequately instructed the jury with reference to
any outside influence.

This case is the type of incident or

occurrence that the cautionary instruction is designed to
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protect; we cannot expect the juror to live in a vaccuum when
he is not sequestered.

This case does not meet the classical

standard of jury misconduct set out in Utah case law.
The second requirement is the prejudicial effect of .
the misconduct.

There must be a departure from what the evidence

is or something that would materially bias or prejudice the juror
in favor of one party or the other.

After viewing the photo-

graphs which were introduced into evidence which depicted the
brutalized body of the infant victim, there is no departure
from the evidence when the juror happened to glance at a
photograph which depicted as the juror stated, "a perfectly
beautiful child lying asleep."
In this case the juror was subjected to a rigorous
examination as opposed to just an affidavit and the examination
shows what effect the incident had on the juror's deliberations:
"THE COURT: Do you remember Mr. .
Lubeck asking you any other questions
or your answering any other matters. Do
you remember that? We are just talking
about his conversation with you now.
THE WITNESS: He asked me if seeing
the baby, of the picture in the coffin, had
any bearing on my decision. He asked me
that, and I said, no. I said, "The only
thing that had bearing on my decision was
the things that happened in the pictures the
District Attorney showed."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT: You mean the ones
that came in evidence?
THE WITNESS: Evidence, yes.
THE COURT: You may continue.
Do you remember saying anything
else to him, or his saying anything
else to you?
THE WITNESS: That that picture
had no bearing at all. It looked like
a perfectly beautiful child lying asleep,
and it had no bearing, but I had seen
pictures of that baby being burned and
hit and hurt and the whole thing is so
hideous, I hate to remember it."
(T. page 11, lines 15-30; page 12, lines
1-3.)
"Q. And it was based solely on the
evidence that was put before you under
oath at the trial, isn't that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you f o l l o w e d t h e c o u r t ' s
admonition not to allow a n y t h i n g t o
i n f l u e n c e you i n y o u r v e r d i c t o t h e r t h a n
what t h e e v i d e n c e had b e e n , i s t h a t r i g h t ?
A. T h i s i s t r u e .
My s i s t e r was h e r e
w i t h me. We t a l k e d a b o u t m o t h e r , and we
t a l k e d a b o u t o t h e r t h i n g s , b u t we n e v e r e v e n
d i s c u s s e d t h e t r i a l i n between o u r s e l v e s .
I
s a i d , " I c a n ' t t a l k t o you a b o u t i t . "
She
s a i d , " I d o n ' t want you t o , " so we t a l k e d , a n d
h e r h u s b a n d was f a i l i n g , and dumb t h i n g s l i k e
that.
We d i d n ' t t a l k a b o u t i t . "
(T. p a g e
20, l i n e s 3-15.)
;

-9-
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"THE COURT: Do you recall
telling Mr. Lubeck anything else
in this conversation? How long
did the conversation last, do
you remember?
THE WITNESS: 0h # just a few
minutes.
THE COURT: About fifteen
minutes?
THE WITNESS: No, not even
that long. A few minutes. He
asked me if the picture that was
shown to me in the ladies' room
had any bearing on the case, and
I said, 'Absolutely not.'" (T.
page 12, lines 24-30; page 13,
lines 1-3.)

j
j

The juror restricted her deliberations to the
evidence that was adduced under oath and there is nothing
introduced that would indicate that this defendant was
prejudiced at all by this particular incident.
This record has been reviewed previously by three
courts, none of which have concluded that sufficient prejudice
was shown by Mr. Gee.

Judge D. Frank Wilkins, in his Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the coram nobis petition,
concluded as follows:

-10-
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" (2) That one of the jurors,
Nola V. Bartol, during the course of
said trial, was in the ladies' restroom
at a time when a woman whose identity
is unknown displayed to persons a
photo of decedent in coffin.
(3) That at no time was the
picture displayed directly to Nola V .
Bartol.
(4) That the said Nola V. Bartol,
upon realizing what was occurring,
left the ladies' restroom.
(5) That the incident complained
of in no way affected the said Nola V.
Bartol's deliberations as a juror in
the case.
(6) That the said Nola V . Bartol
based her conclusion of guilt of Thomas
Devon Gee upon the evidence introduced
in the trial by the State.
(7) That the photograph in question
was not shown specifically to Nola V.
Bartol but was displayed to the ladies
present in the ladies' restroom at the
time Judge Wilkins conclusion of law
was to deny the petition for writ of
coram nobis." (T.129).
(Emphasis added.)

|

Judge Willis W. Ritter in denying M r . Gee leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on a writ of habeas corpus concluded
as follows:
"Gee alleges that he was denied a
fair trial because during a recess in
the trial the grandmother of the
murdered child had displayed to persons

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in the women's restroom, while a juror
was in the restroom, a photograph purporting to show the decedent in his
coffin. Gee attempted to raise this
issue in a petition for a writ of coram
nobis. During the hearing on the petition,
the juror admitted that she had seen the
picture, but stated that seeing the picture in
no way affected her decision as to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. . .
j
"In summary, Gee has failed to show
that he was denied a fair and impartial trial.
Because Gee's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus fails to present any cognizable claims,
his motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1915(d)
and should be denied."
Although the Utah Supreme Court did not rule on the
photograph issue on the appeal from Judge Wilkins' coram nobis
proceeding, and instead held that coram nobis was an improper
remedy, this Court did review the facts of this case and
summarized them as follows:
"At the (coram nobis) hearing, evidence
was adduced which indicated that during the
course of the trial, while one of the jurors
was in women's restroom, an unidentified woman
displayed a photograph, purporting to show the
decedent in his coffin. The picture was not
specifically shown to the juror but was displayed
generally to all those present in the room. Upon
realizing what was occurring, the juror immediately
left the room. She testified that the incident
in no way affected her deliberation as a juror and
that she based her conclusion of defendant's
guilt upon the evidence introduced at trial."

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
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Specific pages of the transcript which clearly show
that no prejudice occurred are as follows:
Transcript, page 11, lines 19 through 23, 29 through.
30:

only influenced by pictures district attorney showed in

court.

!
•

•

.

•

•

•

T r a n s c r i p t , page 13, l i n e s 8 through 1 1 :

i

the coffin

p i c t u r e had no bearing on her v e r d i c t .
T r a n s c r i p t , page 18 and 19:

the photograph had no

bearing on her d e c i s i o n .
T r a n s c r i p t , page 20:

photograph showed to everyone

generally in the restroooi/ not s p e c i f i c a l l y t o j u r o r , and j u r o r
immediately l e f t the room.
T r a n s c r i p t , page 25:

r e a l reason why she almost hung

the j u r y .
F i n a l l y , respondent submits t h a t none of the a u t h o r i t i e s
c i t e d by appellant are on point with the i n s t a n t c a s e .
In State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 P a c ' 3 5 6 (1901),
a new t r i a l was granted a defendant in a c a p i t a l murder case
on the b a s i s of two j u r o r ' s b i a s , formed p r i o r to t r i a l , toward

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the defendant.

The court in that case noted that any mis-

conduct of a juror which prevents a fair and impartial
consideration of the evidence is a possible ground for a new
trial:
"The cases are numerous which
hold that misconduct by one or more
of the jury, which might have been
prejudicial to the accused, raises the
presumption, especially in a capital
case, that the accused has been prejudiced
thereby, and vitiates the verdict unless
the prosecution shows beyond a reasonable
doubt that the prisoner has received no
injury by reason thereof." Icl. at 360.

j

The Court in Morgan, supra, also rejected the prosecution's
attempts to cleanse the jurors in question by self-serving
affidavits to the effect that they (the jurors) acted impartially
in determining the case.

Much could be made of this if the

facts in Morgan were not so inopposite to the present case.
In Morgan the defense produced affidavits from
several unimpeachable sources to the effect that two jurors
had, prior to trial, stated that the defendant should be lynched
as he was obviously guilty and later, neither juror denied making

-14i
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the prior statements during the motion hearing.

These same

jurors during voir dire examination swore that they had
formed no opinion on the issues in question.

This compelling

evidence overcame affidavits by the jurors claiming impartiality:
"Each of these jurors in.his
affidavit states that he acted impartially
in the case, but, in view of their false
statements and concealments of the facts
admitted on this motion, their statements
are not sufficient to overcome the presumption arising from the admitted facts."
Id. at 361.

j

What emerges from an examination of the Morgan case are two
salient features:

(1)

That the prosecution can, if possible,

show that an event, or act, can be harmless error, and (2)
the probative value of a juror's affidavit is dependent on the
circumstances surrounding the events purported to compromise
that juror and therefore the jury's verdict.
Another Utah case, State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415,
237 Pac. 941 (1925), presents another circumstance in which
affidavits by a witness and a juror were insufficient to
overcome a presumption of impropriety.

In Anderson, a juror

had received a ride to and from the court from the prosecuting
witness who had a vital interest in the outcome of the trial.
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This was not an isolated incident but was continuous for
approximately three weeks.
Although the juror swore in an affidavit that he was
in no way influenced by the courtesy rendered him by the
witness, the court ordered the granting of a new trial:

j
j

"The authorities, however, all
agree that any conduct or relationship
between a juror and a party to an action
during trial that would or might,
consciously or unconsciously, tend to
influence the judgment of the juror
authorizes and requires the granting
of a new trial, unless it is made to
appear affirmatively that the judgment
of the juror was in no way affected by
such relationship. . . . " Anderson at
943. (Emphasis added.)
Anderson amplifies the Morgan holding by noting that some
circumstances alone, in the absence of shown prejudice, can
so taint a juror so as to render him incompetent in a given
case in spite of averments of impartiality.
The Gee case, however, does not present even a
slightly analogous factual situation.

There has been no

showing of actual prejudice on the part of the juror; rather,
it is broadly claimed that the single incident of her viewing
a picture was so inherently prejudicial as to render her unfit
to be a juror.

It is difficult to see how such an argument is

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tenable.

The juror had seen, in court, pictures of the actual

injuries to the child's body, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96,
498 P.2d 662 (1972) . Under these circumstances, the picture
displayed to the juror in the restroom had lost any prejudicial
impact that it may have otherwise possessed.

The exposure was

not lengthy, and did not involve, as far as can be determined,
any party to the action.

It was the "party" contact in

Anderson which, coupled with the time element involved, raised
an irrebutable inference of impropriety.

The Court in Anderson

acknowledged that contacts limited in nature present a different
question:
"We are not here dealing with
one act of carrying a juror to his
home as was the count in Hilton v.
Southwick, 17 Me. 303, 35 Am.Dec.

See also State v. Hockett, 238 P.2d 539, 172 Kan. 1; State v.
Bryan, 153 Kan, 822, 113 P.2d 1052, to the effect that trivial
acts are not grounds for a new trial.
Because the act in question was so insubstantial
under the circumstances, it is incumbent upon the defendant
to show prejudice, as it should not be inferred.

Other juris-

dictions also require an element of prejudicial effect.\

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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In People v. Yee King, 24 Cal.App. 509, 141 Pac. 1047
(1941), defendant was convicted of murder. Two jurors made an
f
unauthorized visit at the scene of the homicide. They discussed
certain features of the case and locations that were diagramed
and introduced at trial.

The Court said:
•

•!

"The unauthorized evidence received
out of court was in effect but a reproduction of certain particular evidence previously adduced in court. No affirmative
showing was made in the affidavits or by
the testimony received upon the hearing of
the motion for a new trial, that the
two jurors in question had seen or heard
at the place of the homicide anything
different from or contradictory of the
evidence adduced at trial . . .
"This being so, it cannot be fairly
said that the showing made in support of
the motion for a new trial would have
warranted the court below in finding that
the visit of the two jurors to the scene
of the homicide resulted in substantial
injury to the defendant."
In our case, the photograph was, at the most, a
replica of what was introduced into the criminal trial and
not a departure from that evidence, that could materially
prejudice defendant's case.

Therefore, this case fails to meet

the second requirement of prejudice and respondent submits that
under the circumstances of this case the defendant did receive
a fair trial by an impartial jury.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.
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Finally, the Gee situation is clearly distinguishable
from the Morgan and Anderson cases in that the juror, Nola Bartol,
did not submit an "affidavit" alleging that she had not been
prejudiced by the photograph, but instead, personally came in and
testified at the coram nobis hearing and submitted herself to crossexamination by Mr. Gee's attorney (unlike an affidavit where crossexamination is impossible).
Based on the foregoing authorities, respondent submits
the appellant has not established the juror's actual prejudice,
and the facts are not such as to raise an automatic inference of
irrebuttable prejudice.
POINT II
IF ERROR IS FOUND BY THIS COURT, RESPONDENT SUBMITS
THAT IT IS HARMLESS ERROR AND IN ITS ABSENCE THERE IS NO
REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THE VERDICT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.
The main question here is whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the incident so prejudiced the
juror that in its absence there might have been a different
result.

In State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322

(1974), defendant was convicted of robbery and assault with
a deadly weapon.

Defendant claimed prejudicial error because
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of the prosecutor's inquiry as to whether defendant had used
the same gun to perpetrate another robbery.

This Court said:

"That there should be no reversal
of a conviction merely because of error
or irregularity, but only if it is
substantial and prejudicial in the
sense that in its absence there is a
reasonable likelihood that there would
have been a different result."
In State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297
I

!

(1969)# defendants were convicted of murder in the first
degree.

The court refused to declare a mistrial when a police

officer while testifying made remarks concerning "prison release
picture" and "city police department photograph" of defendant
was not prejudicial but harmless.

This Court stated:

"This court may not interfere
with a jury verdict, unless upon review
of the entire record, there emerge
errors of sufficient gravity to indicate
that defendants' rights were prejudiced
in some substantial manner, the error
must be such that it is reasonably
probable that there would have been a
result more favorable to the appellant
in the absence of error."
In State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966),
defendant was convicted of attempting to obtain money by false
pretenses and claimed prejudicial error in not being represented
by counsel at the preliminary hearing.

This Court stated:

-20Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"There should be no dismissal
of'a charge nor reversal of a judgment
unless there was a significant failure
or abuse of due process of law, or
unless there was an error or defect
which it could reasonably be supposed
put the defendant at some substantial
disadvantage, or had some substantial
prejudicial effect upon his rights."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), is applied to the .
previously cited cases as well as to our case.

It states:

"Judgment to disregard errors not
affecting rights of paries.—After hearing an appeal the court must give judgment
without regard to errors or defects which
do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties. If error has been committed,
it shall not be presumed to have resulted
in prejudice. The court must be satisfied
that it has that effect before it is
warranted in reversing the judgment."
In our case, the defendant was not prejudiced, nor
were his rights abused when the juror, unintentionally happened
to glance at the photograph.

The photograph itself was not a

departure from the evidence introduced at trial; in effect, it
was a replica of that evidence and did not substantially
violate defendant's due process rights.
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Therefore, the error being harmless under the
previously cited authorities and Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1
(1953), respondent submits that this case does not warrant
a reversal of the lower court's denial of the writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds of prejudicial error.
CONCLUSION
When the record is examined in our case the juror's
conduct does not go beyond the usual amenities between a nonsequestered juror and acquaintances.

But more importantly,

the photograph was a mere replica of the evidence; after
viewing the photographs introduced into evidence which depicted
the beaten victim, seeing a glance of a photograph of the victim
in a peaceful state is not prejudicial.

Therefore, respondent

respectfully submits that the decision of the lower court to
deny the petition of habeas corpus be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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